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Abstract 
An understanding of insider threats in information 
systems (IS) is important to help address one of the 
dangers lurking within organizations. This article 
provides a review of the literature on insider 
compliance (and failure of compliance) with 
information systems’ policies in order to understand 
the status of IS research regarding negligent and 
malicious insiders. We begin by defining the terms, 
developing a new taxonomy of insiders, and then 
providing a comprehensive review of articles on IS 
policy compliance for the past 26 years. Grounding 
the analysis in the literature, we inductively identify 
four themes to foster Information Security policy 
compliance among employees. The themes are: 1) IS 
management philosophy, 2) procedural 
countermeasures, 3) technical countermeasures, and 
4) environmental countermeasures. We propose that 
future research can draw upon these themes and use 
them as the building blocks of an indigenous IS 
security theory.  
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Introduction 
Ashley Madison is a dating website for married 
couples who wish to cheat on their spouses. On July 
20, 2015, Ashley Madison site’s customer data was 
stolen, the systems were compromised, large 
quantities of supposedly confidential data were 
appropriated, and a small percentage of user account 
secret affairs data with matching credit card 
transactions were exposed to the public (BBC News, 
2015). The hackers planned to post more data online 
until the website closed. Security experts indicated 
that the company’s negligent insider(s) might have 
clicked on a phishing email and thus unintentionally 
assisted the hackers (BBC News, 2015). This 
incident cost the mother company $370,000 (as a 
reward money to catch the hackers), the CEO his job 
(who resigned), and two people their lives who 
committed suicide after the hackers exposed their 
infidelity (Sharp, 2015; Zetter, 2015). 
Despite the press coverage, the Ashley Madison 
hack was not an isolated case nor was the action a 
new trend. Throughout the years, studies have 
consistently indicated that current employees are 
responsible for over 50 percent of reported security 
breaches (PWC, 2015) and that carelessness or lack 
of awareness accounts for nearly 40 percent of 
insider security incidents (Young, 2014). A CSI/FBI 
report (Richardson, 2011) showed that internal actors 
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were responsible for no less than half of significant 
cyber security breaches. These figures intensify the 
constant mandate to decrease the risk of negligent — 
as well as opportunistic and malicious — insiders in 
organizations. According to the same CSI study, 66.1 
percent of the respondents reported that up to 20 
percent of total company losses are attributed to 
nonmalicious insiders, and 87.1 percent of the 
respondents reported that up to another 20 percent of 
losses are attributed to malicious insiders 
(Richardson, 2011). 
Furthermore, 29 percent of data breaches occur 
through social engineering tactics (Verizon, 2013), 
similar to the phishing email example in Ashley 
Madison’s case. Social engineering can be 
successful only if and when employees are unaware 
and ill-equipped to handle such techniques used by 
hackers. There are a number of insider threat 
examples to draw upon: 
 Just before her company downsized, a 
disgruntled employee used her expertise to 
encrypt her company’s database, only to offer her 
services to decipher it for $10,000 afterward, with 
the promise of no legal action. She regarded the 
fee as compensation for her job termination 
(Shaw et al., 1998).  
 Tse Thow Sun sold trade secrets to a competitor 
of his current employer, a software company, in 
exchange for $3 million. He pled guilty in April 
2003 to theft of proprietary information (Hunter, 
2003). 
 An employee tried to beat her organization’s 
time-consuming, work-impeding security system 
in a newly implemented Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP). She asked her colleague to 
replicate an action on her desktop’s keyboard, 
preventing a log out while she was away from her 
office. Ironically, instead of enhancing security, 
the ERP system contributed to an increase in 
security risk (Boudreau & Robey, 2005). 
Insider threat risk has not been diminishing over time. 
According to a survey of 671 IT and IT security 
practitioners, information systems security risks are 
generally on the rise and negligent insider threat risk 
still remains high (Ponemon Institute, 2012). The 
same institute found that practitioners and IT 
managers are witnessing the greatest rise of potential 
IT security risk within their work environment in both 
the negligent dimension (according to 43 percent of 
the respondents) and in the malicious dimension 
(according to 16 percent of the respondents) 
(Ponemon Institute, 2012). 
Thus, organizational information systems security is 
directly linked to the effectiveness of the 
implementations of IS policies inside organizations 
(Straub & Welke, 1998). The effectiveness of IS 
policies is directly tied to employee compliance. This 
paper addresses IS policy compliance, a cornerstone 
in ensuring IS security in organizations. 
Research in IS security in organizations seeks to 
uncover how to best fortify the organization against 
outside hackers. In order to be effective in this, the IT 
department’s security experts need to transform 
every employee in the organization into an 
unbreakable link in the security chain. For that 
reason, and since the majority of employees are not 
very knowledgeable about security issues, 
employees need specific and understandable 
guidelines known as IS security policies. The IT 
department expects employees to abide by these 
laws, that is, to comply with IS security policies. A 
lack of compliance from even one employee weakens 
the chain, creating a vulnerability in the impenetrable 
wall from which a hacker can breach IS security. The 
lack of compliance (i.e., noncompliance or violations 
of policies) from an employee is termed as an “insider 
threat” to IS security in the organization. IT 
management uses IS security policy compliance as a 
means of diminishing insider threats.  Since 
noncompliance creates a state of insider threat, for 
simplicity, both terms (insider threat and compliance) 
are used interchangeably in this study. 
Several reasons moved us to embark on this 
research. First, the literature of IS security policy 
compliance dates from the early 1990s, which means 
there is a need to make sense of an extensive 
amount of research from more than two decades. 
Second, although there are excellent IS security 
reviews, these are intended to provide a broad 
coverage of the IS security topic and hence do not 
expressly focus on IS security policy compliance.  For 
example, an excellent general security meta-analysis 
of both technical and socio-technical articles is 
available from Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007), 
but it barely touches on policy compliance. Another 
IS security review specifically examines articles that 
employ general deterrence theory (GDT) to questions 
of IS security (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011).  A broader 
review of security compliance would need to include 
many other theories. In this article, we go beyond 
covering GDT and incorporate the empirical articles 
that include all the approaches, methodologies, 
theories, philosophies, and countermeasures tested 
in IS research for a period of 26 years to deter insider 
threats and ensure IS security policy compliance on 
the employee level in organizations. Recently, Guo 
(2013) provided a broad review of the IS security 
literature including a taxonomy. Although the 
taxonomy we develop is consistent with Guo’s 
taxonomy in considering intention (malicious vs. 
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nonmalicious), willingness to comply (willing vs. 
unwilling), and level of ability to comply or not (high 
ability vs. low ability), it is different in focus and 
contribution. Whereas Guo focuses on understanding 
the dependent variable (e.g., security behavior), our 
review focuses on the antecedents of compliance or 
the independent variables. After examining hundreds 
of independent variables, we come up with four 
overarching themes: Philosophy of IS management 
(development or deterrence), Procedural 
countermeasures, Technical countermeasures, and 
Environmental countermeasures. We found that 
these are the potential building blocks of an 
indigenous IS security theory, based on the past 26 
years of IS security research. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the first section, 
we present the boundaries of our study, the 
relationship between the compliance research and 
insider threats, a definition of insider threats, and a 
new comprehensive taxonomy. The next section 
provides a concise overview of the research 
methodology used to accomplish this review. The 
literature review follows the methodology section, 
treating each theme (developed inductively) 
simultaneously on both negligent and malicious 
insider levels. The paper concludes with the 
theoretical contributions and suggests the use of the 
abstract themes developed in the study as the 
building blocks of a potential indigenous IS security 
theory. 
The Concept of Insider Threat  
In the context of IS, the term “insiders” refers to 
“employees who are authorized to use a particular 
system or facility” (Neumann, 1999). Our review is on 
the compliance of insiders, but in our article inclusion 
decisions, we accepted those articles that use 
several different keywords or terms related to 
compliance. We found many terms regarding insider 
threats in the IS security literature, for example, 
“computer crime,” “computer abuse,” “IS misuse,” 
“policy compliance,” and so on. Although these terms 
include outside threats, such as data breaches from 
outside hackers, they necessarily encompass both 
outside and insider threats. Hence we include these 
terms in our insider threat security research. We 
argue that each of these terms is related to IS 
security policy noncompliance. Every breach, every 
misuse, every crime, and all cyberloafing, goes back 
to an employee who is not abiding by (or not 
complying with) the IS security policies in place 
(assuming there are policies in place). Regardless of 
the security problem, the question at hand is a 
compliance failure. These are two sides of the same 
coin. For example, Straub (1990) uses the keyword 
“computer crime” in his article, nevertheless, he is 
clearly dealing with insider compliance and 
noncompliance in his discussion section. The 
following quotations from his seminal article clearly 
equate the terms “computer crime” (in the author’s 
keywords section) with “compliance/noncompliance” 
(in his discussion section): the “follow up of all 
identified violations will deter potential abusers and 
encourage compliance with security directives” 
(1990, p. 272) and “an active security staff and a 
commitment to data security are effective controls, as 
are activities in which security staff inform users 
about unacceptable system use and penalties for 
noncompliance” (p. 274). Another example occurs 
in the seminal work of Harrington (1996). In the 
keywords section of her article, she uses the words 
“abuse and crime” and “computer crime” among 
others, along with using the word “compliance” in her 
hypothesis development: “the existence of a code of 
ethics and the affidavit of compliance often signed 
by the employee suggest sanctions will occur should 
the code be broken” (p. 259). Her use of the terms 
“abuse and crime” and “compliance” in the main body 
of the article proves that these terms are the two 
faces of the same coin. Therefore: 1) our inclusion of 
the broader literature (e.g. computer abuse, computer 
crime...) and not just strictly compliance literature is 
appropriate,  2) our defined topic is compliance (or 
the lack thereof) inside organizations (regardless of 
the motivation: malicious, opportunistic, or negligent), 
and 3) our free use of the terms is not coincidental 
but intentional, since all of the terms, “computer 
crime,” “misuse,” “breach,” “cyberloafing,” etc., are 
directly related to a failure of compliance. 
In this paragraph, we discuss the motivation behind 
creating a new taxonomy of insider threats. First, the 
structure of our review follows a taxonomy that we 
developed for this study. We reviewed employee 
compliance, which requires understanding who the 
employees are: whether they are a homogenous or a 
diverse group. Another reason for writing this section 
is the need for improving or upgrading the existing 
taxonomies in the literature because of some of their 
shortcomings. The taxonomy by Stanton, Stam, 
Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2005) is a two-factor 
organization of security behaviors based on expertise 
(high-low) and intentions (malicious, neutral, and 
beneficial). Our taxonomy (Table 1) adds another 
dimension to Stanton et al.’s taxonomy: the 
willingness to comply. Opportunistic employees are 
unwilling to comply, although they have nonmalicious 
intentions. It seems best to describe these types of 
employees as opportunistic rather than neutral, since 
they are willingly and knowingly noncompliant and 
their acts may lead to unanticipated damages. 
Another taxonomy is that of Willison and Warkentin 
(2013), where the authors expand Loch, Carr, and 
Warkentin’s (1992) IS security threat vector 
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taxonomy, and divide the internal human threat into a 
continuum of three types: 1) passive, non-volitional 
noncompliance; 2) volitional (but not malicious) 
noncompliance; and 3) intentional, malicious 
(harmful) computer abuse. Our taxonomy adds an 
ability dimension, which is the skillfulnes of the 
employee to either protect or hack the system.  
Table 1 presents our taxonomy of insiders based 
upon our reading of the literature. The table divides 
the types of insiders among three groups: compliant 
users (quadrant 1),  negligent users (naïve and 
opportunistic, quadrants 2 and 3, respectively), and 
malicious users (quadrant 5). These three groups 
(four quadrants) are discussed at length in the IS 
literature. Potential opportunistic or potential 
malicious insiders (quadrants 4 and 6, respectively) 
are virtually nonexistent in the literature (and thus out 
of the scope of this review). We believe that the study 
of potential negligent and malicious insiders are 
absent from the literature because researchers lack 
theoretical explanations to accurately predict and 
identify the employees who may turn out to be 
opportunistic or malicious insiders in the future. We 
note that there is a rising interest among IS 
researchers to develop theories and models to 
understand potential opportunistic or potential 
malicious insiders (see Willison & Warkentin, 2013). 
However, since there is a dearth of empirical articles 
that study these types of insiders, we have not 
included these two categories of insiders here. What 
follows is a description of the well-researched 
categories of insiders, the second and third groups 
mentioned above (negligent and malicious insiders), 
with a passing note on the first group. 
The first group, the compliant insiders, are IS users 
who comply with IS policies. This group is not treated 
independently in the scope of the present manuscript, 
mainly because IS security literature does not treat 
them independently. The literature tends to ask why 
people do not comply and what can be done about it. 
It does not seek to understand the characteristics of 
individuals who comply nor understand why they 
comply.  Furthermore, compliant insiders are the 
byproduct of implementing countermeasures that 
force and/or encourage a user to comply. In this 
study, we outline these countermeasures and we 
assume that their end result will be compliant IS 
users in organizations. The same reasons, 
countermeasures, or motives (verbal praise, fear 
appeal, technical monitoring, etc.) that may motivate 
the potential noncompliant employees will also 
motivate the compliant employees. Thus, the 
compliant quandrant is indirectly covered in our 
study. 
The second group, the negligent insiders, are the IS 
users who do not comply with their organizations’ IS 
policies, albeit for nonmalicious reasons.   This group 
consists of two subcategories: negligent naïve and 
negligent opportunistic. An employee who carelessly 
plugs his personal USB flash drive (regularly used on 
his personal laptop) into his work computer (without 
scanning it first) can be an example of a naïve 
negligent insider. He did not know that some types of 
worms (malware programs) are able to detect 
passwords and send them back to outside hackers. 
The right clicks on the wrong websites on his 
personal laptop may unleash the worm, which 
embeds itself in the USB flash drive. If the flash drive 
is not scanned first by powerful antivirus software and 
is plugged into the desktop of a work computer in an 
organization, it registers the computer’s password 
and sends it to the hacker automatically via the 
Internet. Thus, an outside hacker gains access to a 
computer inside the organization because of a 
negligent naïve employee (quadrant 2 in Table 1). 
An employee who knows how to update his desktop’s 
security software but neglects to do so because he 
has deadlines to meet is a good example of the 
second subcategory of the negligent insider, the 
“opportunistic” user (quadrant 3 in Table 1). Another 
expression for negligent opportunistic is “abusive 
insider,” which describes the noncomplying employee 
who neglects IS policies knowingly, thereby abusing 
the system. Henceforth, we will use the notation of 
“opportunistic insider” instead of abusive insider, in 
order to depart from the negative nuance that the 
word “abusive” may have. Opportunistic insiders do 
not intend to harm the company; they just want to 
circumvent policies for nonmalicious reasons. Both 
types of negligent insiders (naïve and opportunistic) 
pose indirect threats to the IS security of the 
organization for which they work. 
Therefore, logically, negligent insiders can be 
categorized into two subcategories according to their 
ability and willingness: some IS users are willing to 
comply but are not able (naïve acts caused by lack of 
awareness or training), while others are able to 
comply but are not willing (opportunistic acts caused 
by negative motivation). The absence of malicious 
intent to harm the company is what differentiates 
these two negligent subcategories from malicious 
insiders. Hence naïve acts and opportunistic acts are 
surveyed under the same category of negligent 
insiders. 
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Table 1. Insider Types - Matrix
Intent  Nonmalicious Intent Malicious Intent 
Willingness 
Ability 
Willing to Comply Unwilling to Comply Unwilling to Comply 
High Expertise I) Compliant 
III) Negligent 
(opportunistic acts) 
V) Malicious 
Low Expertise 
II) Negligent (naïve 
acts) 
IV) Negligent 
(opportunistic acts) – 
potential 
VI) Malicious - potential 
The third group, the malicious insiders (quadrant 5 in 
Table 1), are the IS users who do not comply with 
the organization’s IS policies for malicious reasons.  
They are deliberately noncompliant in order to harm 
the company. They may try to alter or destroy 
information by curbing or destroying existing security 
countermeasures. A disgruntled employee who 
plants a logic bomb (a software program that once 
planted in a system may erase data in a specified 
day/time) in the organization’s main server before 
the deadline of his employment termination is a 
good example of a malicious insider. 
Having described our version of different types of 
insiders as presented in the taxonomy in Table 1, we 
will next describe the research methodology used to 
identify the articles for our review. 
Research Methodology 
In order to be as inclusive as possible, our approach 
towards the literature search followed a twofold 
process. First, we sought to survey all the articles on 
IS policy compliance in the top 25 IS journals 
depicted in the worldwide ranking in Lowry et al. 
(2004), available on the official AIS website. Since 
one was in the German language, 24 journals were 
included. Furthermore, one extra journal was added 
(the Journal of Information Technology) because it is 
included in the senior scholars’ basket, but is not in 
the Lowry et al. ranking. Thus, the number of 
surveyed journals remained at 25. 
We used the following databases to initiate the 
search process: ABI/Inform, ScienceDirect, and 
Business Source Complete, as well as the AIS 
website. These databases are known for their 
inclusion of business, management, computer 
science, and information systems journals (and 
include our 25 IS journals). We used the following 
keyword searches in both titles and author-supplied 
keywords: security, policy, compliance, and 
noncompliance.  We placed heavy emphasis on the 
word “security” in the searches because of the fact 
that the majority of the papers prior to 2005 use the 
keyword “security” rather than “compliance,” even if 
they treat compliance in the paper. Reading and 
analysis of the literature began in early 2013. 
Therefore, the initial search incorporated peer 
reviewed articles from 1990 to 2012 inclusive. We 
subsequently conducted a post-hoc search for 
articles published in the years 2013-2015 to bring 
the review up-to-date prior to publication.  We 
scanned the articles’ titles and abstracts to identify 
relevant articles on compliance with IS security 
policies and insider threats to IS security. 
We also scanned all the references of the identified 
key articles to double-check the inclusion of relevant 
studies. We only included empirical studies at the 
user/employee unit of the analysis. Conceptual 
articles and those pertaining to other levels of 
analysis were discarded to keep our study focused 
and manageable. A total of 67 articles were 
identified and selected (Appendix A; also see 
Appendix B for the distribution of papers among the 
journals). All the articles were thoroughly studied to 
confirm that they dealt with insider threats to IS 
security and/or IS security policy 
compliance/noncompliance. Furthermore, the 
references of a meta-analysis of security research 
(Siponen & Oinas, 2007) were consulted to ensure 
the inclusion of all the relevant articles prior to 2007. 
In order to emphasize the lack of studies of purely 
malicious insiders, we categorized each identified 
article in Appendix A into 1) purely malicious, 2) 
malicious and negligent (including the latter’s 
subcategories of naïve or opportunistic), or 3) purely 
negligent (with both subcategories). Some of the 
articles were difficult to classify because the authors 
did not provide any indications (phrases, author 
supplied keywords, clear wording in the 
questionnaires, etc.) that clearly identified the paper 
as dealing with certain types of insiders. They 
seemed to deal with insiders in a general manner. 
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Thus, these articles remained uncategorized, but 
were nevertheless incorporated into the overall 
analysis. 
Since not all articles in our sample differentiate 
between different types of insiders, the researchers 
inferred the type of threat. These inferences were 
made by carefully examining the research model, 
survey items, and/or the scenarios used by the 
study. The following constructs used in the models 
guided the researchers to classify the respective 
articles as dealing with negligent threats:  self-
efficacy; resource availability; safety/vulnerability (of 
work files from outside attacks);  security education, 
training, and awareness (SETA) or training 
programs; response efficacy; response cost; and 
work impediment. These constructs imply that 
employees are technically able to comply with IS 
policies; that they have the company resources, 
including the technical means, to protect their files 
from outsider threats; that they are educated, 
trained, and aware of security measures; that the 
security software used in the organization is 
effective in blocking external attacks; and that the 
security measures are perceived as counter-
productive. 
Survey items and scenario cases similar to the 
following implied that the article also dealt with 
negligent threats: “It is ok to share passwords with 
colleagues” or “It is ok to violate the company 
information security policy if no damage is done to 
the company.” Finally, articles with keywords that 
included “Security Awareness Training,” “Security 
Policy Compliance,” “IS Misuse,” and “Compliance 
and Information Security Awareness” indicated that 
the article dealt with negligent threats, since these 
procedures are not usually applied to malicious 
insiders. The articles on malicious insider threats 
were identified based on keywords, including 
“Computer Crime” or “Abuse and Crime,” or wording 
and expressions in the text like “revenge,” 
“disgruntled employees,” “criminal activities,” 
“criminal behavior,” and “crime and anti-social acts.” 
All the articles were thoroughly studied to confirm 
their classification as negligent, malicious, or both. 
When an article included both, it was classified as 
both “malicious and negligent” in Appendix A. 
See Appendix A for a list of the articles reviewed in 
this paper and a summary of the different 
categorizations by chronological date of publication. 
The chronological mapping provides the following 
insight: the research on negligent insiders is 
continuous, whereas the research on malicious 
insiders is sporadic. This finding in 2016 is still 
consistent with what the editorial article observed in 
2009 (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). 
Literature Review 
In this section, the main themes that emerged from 
the review are identified and analyzed. Each theme 
begins with its treatment under negligent threats, 
followed by its treatment under malicious threats. 
We believe that these themes can serve as the 
building blocks for the development of an indigenous 
IS security theory. The section concludes with 
suggestions for future research. 
The literature review section is organized as follows: 
the conceptual themes are introduced first, along 
with the analysis of the 67 articles. Table 2 gives a 
concise outline of the review. The literature review 
section is summarized by an overview of negligent 
and malicious insider threats. Then an overview of 
the theories used in IS policy compliance and insider 
threat research is presented, followed by an 
overview of the methodologies used in all of the 
articles. 
The Conceptual Themes 
The themes are the abstractions of the constructs, 
independent variables, and measurement items 
used in the sample papers. For example, constructs, 
such as policies or training and awareness programs 
tested and analyzed in the research, are categorized 
as procedural countermeasures (Theme 2); software 
monitoring and access control as technical 
countermeasures (Theme 3). In the following 
section, each theme will be defined and discussed in 
terms of both the negligent and malicious 
categories. The panoramic view of the current status 
of IS literature on this topic can be found in Table 3 
(a-b) found at the end of this section. We identified 
28 studies that can be used against both negligent 
and malicious insiders, 37 purely negligent insider 
studies, and two uncategorized. 
The process through which IS management tries to 
strengthen the links in the security chain of the 
organization is by making every employee abide or 
comply with the IS policies. In this section, we 
describe the countermeasures that IS management 
uses in order to make employees comply with IS 
policies by force or, in other words, to counteract 
noncompliance and the state of insider threat 
created by noncompliance. Alternatively,  
management may take a more positive philosophy 
by encouraging employees to follow the rules. In this 
study, the philosophies of countermeasures were 
either negative (by deterrence) or positive (by 
development). We identified four overarching 
themes depicting countermeasures for addressing 
insider threats to IS security: (1) implementing 
different philosophies of countermeasures (of 
deterrence and development), (2) applying 
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procedural countermeasures, (3) applying technical 
countermeasures, and (4) enhancing environmental 
countermeasures. Next, we define each of these 
themes and, in a section for each, describe them in 
a more comprehensive way.  
In this study, the philosophy of countermeasure is 
defined as the philosophical approach IS 
management uses to ensure compliance or to 
decrease noncompliance among employees. There 
are two main philosophies regarding approaches to 
ensure compliance. One approach is a positive 
developmental one, with an emphasis on 
encouragement to comply, referred to here as the 
development philosophy. The second is a more 
negative one, referred to here as the deterrence 
philosophy, with an emphasis on creating fear in the 
case of failure to comply. An example of the 
development philosophy is explaining why 
compliance is beneficial for the employees (for 
example, because it may provide a sense of 
personal satisfaction). An example of the deterrence 
philosophy is informing employees that those who 
do not comply with the newly established policies 
will be penalized financially. 
Procedural countermeasures are managerial 
measures taken by IS management to deter 
noncompliance or encourage compliance with IS 
security policies. This may include forming policies 
and training employees on security awareness. The 
definitions for the procedural and technical 
countermeasures can be found in the literature (Guo 
& Yuan, 2012; Straub, 1990). The rest of the 
definitions are formulated for this study. 
Technical countermeasures are the technical means 
employed by IS management to deter 
noncompliance or encourage compliance with IS 
security policies. This may include software 
monitoring and reviewing computer logs. 
Environmental countermeasures are the social 
measures used by IS management to deter 
noncompliance or to encourage compliance with IS 
security policies. This may include creating a fear 
culture toward security by encouraging supervisors 
to keep tabs on employee compliance, thereby 
creating a heightened sense of subjective norms 
(the expectations of significant people, like the 
employee’s supervisors and colleagues) or creating 
a more positive culture toward security by hiring 
those potential employees that have shown high 
standards of commitment and loyalty to the 
organization they serve. 
We have introduced the themes, and defined and 
described them by giving examples. In the following 
sections we study the literature along the lines of 
these themes in detail. We turn to look closely at 
each of the four themes, describing the studies of 
negligent insiders in each theme first and then 
describing the studies of malicious insiders. 
Table 2. Outline of the Review 
Theme 1: Implementing a Philosophy of 
Deterrence and a Philosophy of Development 
Regarding Countermeasures 
Deterrence Philosophy (negligent threat) 
Deterrence Philosophy (malicious threat) 
Development Philosophy (negligent threat) 
Development Philosophy (malicious threat) 
Theme 2: Applying Procedural Countermeasures 
Forming Policies (negligent and malicious threat) 
Informing Employees (negligent threat) 
Informing Employees (malicious threat) 
Theme 3: Applying Technical Countermeasures 
Technical Countermeasures (negligent and 
malicious threat) 
Theme 4: Enhancing the Environmental 
Countermeasures 
External Environment (negligent threat) 
External Environment (malicious threat) 
Internal Environment (negligent threat) 
Internal Environment (malicious threat) 
 
Theme 1: Implementing a Philosophy of 
Deterrence or a Philosophy of Development 
Regarding Countermeasures 
Seventy percent of the studies of negligent insiders 
(26 papers out of 37) and 93 percent of the studies 
of malicious insiders (26 papers out of 28) cover 
compliance philosophies. The literature presents two 
main philosophies regarding approaches to ensure 
compliance. The two approaches correspond to the 
extrinsic model, which is command and control, and 
the intrinsic model, which is self-regulatory (see 
Tyler & Blader, 2005). These can be understood as 
deterrence and development philosophies. The 
deterrence philosophy threatens employees with 
sanctions to force them to follow IS policies. The 
development philosophy motivates policy 
compliance by offering a reward or by informing IS 
users of the intrinsic benefits and overall safe work 
environment they will experience (safety from 
outside hacking attacks) if they comply with IS 
policies. 
Researchers aiming to test and prove the 
effectiveness of sanctions on malicious insiders 
heavily relied upon the deterrence philosophy. We 
believe this is the case because of the long proven 
history of the deterrence approach; its effectiveness 
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has been shown in dealing with criminal acts not just 
in IS research, but also in governmental and legal 
actions throughout thousands of years of recorded 
human history. Specifically, General Deterrence 
Theory (GDT) was adopted, adapted, and 
contextualized in IS research in the early 1990s. 
There are other possible reasons why deterrence 
theory is widespread in IS security research: IS 
security lacks indigenous theories on security, and 
there are still not enough good robust developmental 
theories (with the exception of Protection Motivation 
Theory, PMT) that have been adopted, adapted, and 
contextualized in IS security research. Given enough 
time and a good direction from IS security editors 
and reviewers, our research community will adopt 
and contextualize more of the developmental 
theories to change potential malicious insiders into 
complying employees. 
GDT focuses on the indirect (or general) prevention 
of crime by making examples of specific 
perpetrators, using the instrument of quickly inflicting 
a severe and particular sanction on the perpetrator. 
It is not surprising to see the influence of this 
approach in IS theory and practice, especially 
pertaining to malicious insiders. How this philosophy 
of deterrence is studied and tested in IS research is 
more fully explained in the following section. 
Deterrence Philosophy (Negligent Threat) 
To determine the effectiveness of deterrence 
philosophy on negligent insiders, the severity and 
certainty of sanctions have been tested, but sanction 
certainty lacked significance: severity had a greater 
impact than certainty in deterring IS misuse 
intentions (D’Arcy et al. 2009). The severity of 
sanctions is the severity of the punishment that may 
be inflicted on noncompliant employees. The 
certainty of sanctions is the likelihood of being 
caught and reprimanded or punished, regardless of 
punishment severity. The researchers explain the 
insignificance of sanction certainty by introducing the 
awareness of policies in a post-hoc analysis. 
Apparently, the certainty of sanction awareness is 
more significant than sanction certainty alone (ibid). 
Since the sanctions are in and of themselves 
insufficient for enforcing compliance, they must be 
communicated to IS users during security training, 
and the employees must be well informed about the 
penalties of breaching security (Straub & Welke, 
1998). 
The fear of sanctions has a deterrent effect, and 
since deterrence increases actual compliance 
(Siponen et al., 2010; Guo & Yuan, 2012), one of the 
means of maximizing IS security is to introduce the 
threat of being fired upon failure of compliance 
(Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006).  The existence of 
codes of ethics has little deterring value if used 
alone, and therefore punishment is an enforcer of 
policies (Harrington, 1996). Sanctions affect the 
perceived cost of noncompliance toward IS policies, 
and therefore compliance intention (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). Moreover, moral reasoning seems to have a 
moderating effect on sanctions. Pre-conventional 
moral reasoning exists when a person is abiding by 
ethical codes because of fear of punishment. This 
reasoning is the only significant moral reasoning that 
deters noncompliance (Myyry et al., 2009). The 
social conformity that makes the employee abide by 
the policies is called “conventional moral reasoning.” 
The firm beliefs and principles that make the 
employee abide by the policies are defined as “post-
conventional moral reasoning.” Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of the deterrence approach is only 
partly dependent on the moral reasoning factor in 
individuals (ibid). This suggests that the perception 
of severity and certainty of sanctions will work best 
only on employees who fear punishment. 
The philosophy of deterrence has other techniques 
besides the enforcement of severity and certainty of 
sanctions.  The detailed formulation or specification 
of security policies and the periodic evaluation of the 
employees’ behaviors based on these specified IS 
policies are positively associated with the 
individual’s perception of compliance mandatoriness 
(see Kirsch & Boss, 2007). Thus, when employees 
notice that management is investing time in 
developing detailed IS policy documents, they will 
perceive the gravity and the seriousness of policy 
compliance. 
Deterrence Philosophy (Malicious Threat)  
Regarding malicious threats, early IS literature on 
insider threats (Straub, 1990; Straub & Nance, 1990) 
found that the severity and certainty of sanctions 
deter computer abuse. Severe punishment could be 
executed on a malicious insider such that he would 
be a living example to other potential perpetrators. In 
the case of the absence of a malicious incident, 
punishment threats should be regularly 
communicated to employees. 
Hu et al. (2011) added another dimension, “the 
celerity of sanctions” to the already tested severity 
and certainty of sanctions and found that the 
deterrence increases the perceptions of informal and 
formal risks. The celerity dimension explains how 
fast a breach, or misuse, will be detected and 
punished. 
The deterrence research on malicious insiders is 
inconsistent in its results: deterrence certainty and 
severity had no influence on compliance behavior in 
one of the articles (Son, 2011) in contrast to the 
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other articles that found that the severity and 
certainty of sanctions significantly decreased IS 
misuse. Perhaps the fact that Son’s (2011) sample 
comes from China could be the cause behind the 
differing worldviews regarding compliance (Leidner 
& Kayworth, 2006). For example, the deterrence 
effect of certain security countermeasures varies 
between U.S. and Korean cultures (Hovav & D’Arcy, 
2012). 
In summary, based on the research of many 
scholars, deterring IS misuse using the severity, 
certainty, and celerity of sanctions is a proven 
technique available to IS management to enforce 
compliance on the company’s negligent as well as 
malicious insiders. Interestingly, the security studies 
did not differentiate among the types of insiders in 
their abilities and intentions (naïve, opportunistic, 
and malicious) when they tested the deterrence 
approach. Their samples consisted of general users 
and not specific malicious, opportunistic, or naïve 
employees. This could be remedied in future IS 
security research. 
Development Philosophy (Negligent Threat) 
The rise of insider security incidents moved some 
scholars to argue that the deterrence model is not 
effective enough. Thus, they started advocating for 
another approach, the development philosophy, 
which uses encouragement to motivate employees 
to comply with IS policies. Although convincing at 
first glance,  the argument of rising incidents cannot 
be firmly attributed to the ineffectiveness of the 
deterrence philosophy. The rising incidents could be 
easily ascribed to the poor implementation and 
appropriation of the deterrence philosophy or to the 
rising number of IT users. Furthermore, punishment 
cannot be abandoned altogether.  People who follow 
rules to avoid punishment and people with low self-
control are deterred better by punishment than by 
ethical training (Workman & Gathegi, 2007). 
Perhaps the explanation of the incentive to shift the 
focus of some research from the deterrence 
approach to the development approach is of a 
philosophical nature: punishment in deterrence 
models embodies a negative approach, and any 
negative approach is frowned upon in a society 
driven by political correctness and eager to explore 
positive approaches to societal problems. Siponen 
and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007), among others, 
encourage researchers to explore motivational 
approaches to ensure IS compliance. Thus, IS 
researchers have recently started to explore a more 
positive dimension to compliance. Although this is a 
relatively new research focus, with most of the 
studies having been published from 2007-2015, 
roughly the same percentage of researchers are 
investigating the development philosophy (43 
percent; 16 out of 37 papers) as the deterrence 
philosophy (48 percent; 18 out of 37 papers) to 
mitigate negligent threats. The percentages depict 
the number of articles testing the specific approach 
divided by the total number of articles using any 
approach in the negligent insider table. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) found that the perceived 
benefit of compliance positively influences 
compliance intention. In their study, the benefit of 
compliance was comprised of intrinsic benefit (a 
sense of accomplishment and satisfaction), the 
safety of the resources (working files being safe from 
virus attacks), and rewards (financial and 
promotional). Furthermore, the increasing 
awareness of the intrinsic cost of noncompliance 
(guilt, stress, and embarrassment) was found to 
positively affect intention to comply. The intrinsic 
cost is not a component of a deterrence approach 
because it is self-inflicted; it is not initiated by the 
organization as formal or informal sanctions are. The 
intrinsic cost is solely dependent on the individual 
character of the insider and his or her emotional 
makeup. Hence we do not group this construct 
under the deterrence approach. The organization 
encourages users to comply by directing them to 
count the cost of potential technical and 
psychological harm resulting from hackers 
destroying work files (extrinsic) or feelings of guilt 
(intrinsic) upon failure of compliance. 
Some studies (Kirsch & Boss, 2007; Pahnila et al., 
2007; Siponen et al., 2010) reached different 
conclusions than Bulgurcu et al. (2010) regarding 
rewards, which may take the form of a pay raise, 
bonuses, or verbally praising IS policy compliant 
employees in front of other colleagues. According to 
these studies, rewards are not related to the 
enhancement of compliance. Others found only 
weak correlations between rewards and good 
practices related to password creation, storage, and 
change (Stanton et al., 2005). This discrepancy in 
the results could be the natural consequence of the 
absence of reward systems in current IS 
departments. Since IS departments do not typically 
use rewards as an incentive for IS policy 
compliance, the survey questions might have been 
regarded as irrelevant by the respondents, thus lead 
to the discrepancy of the results in the above-
mentioned studies. 
Several authors (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; 
Vance et al., 2012) tested the fear appeal, which is 
not induced by punishment, but is generated from an 
outside threat. The fear appeal concept is an 
instrinsic part of protection motivation theory and is 
used in several studies (Boss et al., 2015; Chen & 
Zahedi, 2016; Herath et al., 2014). The authors 
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found that management should uncover the severity 
of an attack coming from a hacker, depicting the 
damage it can do to the work files of employees. 
This step will motivate IS users to abide by the 
security policies and protect their work files, thus 
indirectly protecting the overall organizational 
security. If the work files are compromised, 
organizational security is jeopardized. Fearing 
outside attacks, the employee will seek help by 
others or the IT department in his endeavor to 
comply with the IS policies (Chen & Zahedi, 2016) or 
will be more inclined to adopt an email 
authentication technical service (Herath et al., 2014). 
Not just the severity of an attack, but also the 
efficacy of the security software in place and the 
self-efficacy of employees in applying the security 
software should be emphasized. Along these same 
lines, research has found that as long as employees 
understand the damage of an outside threat to the 
company and perceive the company’s security 
countermeasures as effective, their attitudes toward 
the policies will be positive and they will abide by 
them (Herath & Rao, 2009a; Workman et al., 2008). 
Development Philosophy (Malicious Threat) 
Although the encouragment approach has 
experienced a resurgence in the case of negligent 
insider threats, it has yet to be explored thoroughly 
in terms of malicious insider threats, perhaps for a 
good reason: it seems counterintuitive to use a 
positive approach to deter abuse or criminal acts. 
One of the articles (Lee et al., 2004) measured both 
negligent and malicious intents by using the self-
defense intention (SDI) construct and found that a 
physical security system (i.e., locks on server room 
doors) increases SDI, which in the study is 
composed of the intention to implement access 
control and intrusion protection software. Although 
the article failed to show SDI’s impact on insider 
abuse, it does indicate that at least there was an 
attempt to measure a development approach 
(raising the self-defense intention). Nevertheless, 
the article was not clear whether it was testing the 
case of negligent or malicious insiders. 
Practice shows that malicious insiders desire either 
monetary compensation from competitors who 
reward espionage, or revenge following a salary cut 
or demotion (Shaw et al., 1998; Hunter, 2003). If this 
is the case, rewarding compliance financially (Dhillon 
& Torkzadeh, 2006) could be a promising construct 
to solve the problem of espionage, but it has not yet 
been tested empirically. It seems that deterring 
vengeance (sabotage) is harder than quenching 
materially felt needs (espionage) using a 
development philosophy. Whatever the rewards of 
the development philosophy are, they need to be 
equal to or greater than the benefits of 
noncompliance perceived by opportunistic or 
malicious insiders. For example, using the 
organization’s Internet access for non-work-related 
activities is lucrative (convenience, saving personal 
time and money), and this lucrativeness negatively 
impacts compliance (Li et al., 2010). 
There is only one study in our sample (Peace et al., 
2003) that directly dealt with the theft of software 
and intellectual property (software piracy or 
copying), which is a form of espionage. Other than 
punishment certainty and severity, which are 
beneficial, a new solution was discovered: 
decreasing software costs will lead to lowering the 
incidents of espionage or software copying. This 
could be a positive solution to deterrence, but it is 
restricted in scope and limited to software 
copyrights, rather than addressing overall security in 
organizations. 
Finally, a recent article (Johnston et al., 2015) tested 
both GDT (deterrence approach) and PMT 
(development approach) in the same study. What 
we learn from the recurrence of these two theories in 
IS security research as recently as in 2015, is that 
these two theories are the most succesfully 
appropriated theories in IS security research. Apart 
from these two, there is a clear paucity of IS security 
theories with high explanatory power. 
In summary, two major subcategories have been 
studied to date within development philosophy, 
especially in studies of negligent insiders: 1) 
informing employees of the direct benefits of 
compliance (e.g. intrinsic and financial) and 2) 
informing them about the indirect benefits of 
compliance (e.g. the security of their files). The 
indirect benefits include not having to undergo the 
re-creation of important work files upon losing them 
to successful outside virus attacks. We use the 
terms “direct” and “indirect,” since the direct category 
of benefits is known and experienced daily by the 
employees. The indirect category is known by the 
employees only upon the condition of an attack and 
the unsuccessful mitigation of it. 
Overall, deterrence and development philosophies 
are of little value if they are not written down and 
communicated to IS users. These two concepts, 
forming policies (writing down) and informing 
employees (communication) are discussed next 
under procedural countermeasures. 
Theme 2: Applying Procedural Countermeasures 
Procedural countermeasures are managerial 
practices that include forming policies, informing 
employees about them, and training employees on 
behavioral and technical skills to ensure that they 
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are well aware of the threats and the ways to comply 
with IS policies, and thereby how to mitigate the 
threats. In this section, we will describe forming 
policies and informing employees, first the studies of 
negligent insider threats, followed by that of 
malicious insider threats. 
Forming policies is not in and of itself a 
countermeasure mitigating noncompliance. But 
compliance cannot be assured unless there are 
written policies. Therefore, procedural 
countermeasures (having procedural policies) are 
the backdrop based on which the policies can be 
enforced or encouraged, and eventually followed or 
broken. Policies have two subcategories: First, the 
actual technical rules that increase the security of 
information systems (e.g. not having organizational 
data on personal mobile devices like laptops, 
smartphones, iPads) and describe the punishments 
(or incentives) when a rule is broken (or kept). The 
second one constitutes the actual countermeasure 
or deterrence to noncompliance. Since both are 
important and the first is a prerequisite for the 
second, both are described under the theme of 
forming policies. 
Sixty-five percent of the articles (42 out of 65) deal 
with forming IS policies or codes of ethics along with 
communicating them to the IS users, making this 
one of the most commonly addressed 
countermeasure against insider threats in the IS 
literature. The IS policies that include the costs of 
noncompliance (sanctions) are imperative to deter 
IS misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009), and when they 
include the benefits of compliance (rewards), they 
become useful in encouraging compliance intentions 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Thus, policies can serve both 
deterrence and encouragment approaches and will 
be described as such in the following section. 
Forming Policies (Negligent and Malicious 
Threats) 
Among the earliest responses of IS departments to 
insider threats was the establishment of appropriate 
IS policies and codes of ethics. A security policy 
defines the rules and guidelines for the proper use of 
organizational IS resources (Straub & Nance, 1990). 
Yet the effects of codes of ethics have been found to 
be infrequent and negligible on computer abuse 
intention (Harrington, 1996). The same can be said 
of policies. Motivating compliance requires more 
than just framing and communicating policy to an 
organization’s employees (Lim et al., 2002). Of 
course, we are not suggesting the abolition of written 
codes of ethics. Their importance lies in their legal 
functions,  based on which organizations may take 
action if a violation occurs (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
User participation in policy formation directly raises 
the perception of improvements of security controls, 
which in turn increases the employees’ policy 
compliance (Spears & Barki, 2010). When IS 
management makes employees aware of security 
risks and invites user participation in policy 
formation, employees realize that they have a 
valuable role in enhancing organization security. 
Thus they will be more apt to comply with the 
policies they have contributed in creating. Other 
forms of user participation are whistle-blowing 
policies. When the users are empowered and 
encouraged to report computer abuse in the 
workplace and the system or reporting procedure is 
anonymous, there is an increase in the willingness 
to report the abuse or noncompliance, and therefore 
the overall efficiency of security is enhanced (Lowry 
et al., 2013). 
A small number of studies considered the 
implications of policy characteristics on compliance. 
Characteristics may include things like policy age, 
frequency of update, and clarity. Two studies 
showed that the degree of specificity of IS policies 
(detailed explanations) may increase the employees’ 
perception of the mandatoriness of compliance 
(Boss et al., 2009; Kirsch & Boss, 2007). Another 
study found that information security policies' 
existence, longevity, updates, scope, and adoption 
of best practices have no significant impact on the 
existence and severity of security breaches (Doherty 
& Fulford, 2005). We think national differences could 
be at the root of this discrepancy. The first two 
studies were conducted in the U.S., but the second 
in the U.K. Americans put a greater emphasis on 
punctuality than their U.K. peers (Fullbright 
Commission, 2015), which may explain why 
American employees are more positively affected by 
IS policy age, updates, and clarity than their peers in 
the U.K. This raises the question of whether the 
same countermeasures are equally valid in different 
cultural contexts. Future research may shed light on 
the universality of the effectiveness of 
countermeasures as well as on the different 
philosophies of deterrence and development. 
Another explanation of this discrepancy may be the 
finding that U.K. policies (at least, of the healthcare 
sector) do not promote understanding and are not 
clear enough (Stahl et al., 2012). 
A number of articles tested policies or codes of 
ethics to see their impact on IS malicious misuse. 
For example, guidelines and policies for acceptable 
system use and the dissemination of information 
about sanctions decrease computer abuse (Straub, 
1990; Straub & Nance, 1990; Straub & Welke, 
1998). Similar to the negligent insider case, these 
policies may lose effect if they are not effectively 
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communicated to employees (Straub & Welke, 1998) 
and followed by the enforcement of sanctions in 
case of a breach (Straub & Nance, 1990). 
In summary, IS policies are the backbone of 
countermeasures to deter negligent as well as 
malicious threats, but only the awareness of IS 
policies, not the mere existence of them, decreases 
IS misuse intention (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
Although awareness was described superficially in 
Theme 1 (related to the awareness of sanctions), in 
the next section it will be described in an extensive 
way, encompassing not just the awareness of 
sanctions but also the awareness of what to do and 
how to do it, in relation to policy compliance. 
Informing Employees (Negligent Threat) 
This subtheme speaks about the communication of 
both managerial policies and technical information to 
users. Knowledge of managerial policies is helpful to 
both types of insiders but technical knowledge is 
specifically helpful to negligent IS users. After all, no 
IS department wants to send a potential malicious or 
abusive employee to advanced training to gain 
additional technical knowledge of the systems. 
Informing and educating users can take many forms 
other than technical education or communication of 
managerial policies. For example, informing 
employees about basic security practices may make 
them conscious enough to not share confidential 
data with others on public forums (see Smith et al., 
2012) or on social media. In our study, this type of 
education is labeled raising behavioral knowledge. 
Thus, communicating behavioral knowledge may 
include raising awareness of IS policies and their 
related sanctions and incentives as well as good 
security practices at work. Communicating technical 
knowledge may include raising users’ perceptions of 
self-efficacy, reducing response costs, and 
increasing response efficacy. These two dimensions 
are discussed next. 
Behavioral Knowledge: Security, Education, 
Training, and Awareness (SETA) programs can 
decrease IS misuse intention among negligent 
insiders (D’Arcy et al., 2007, 2009) [SETA programs 
are named “cues to action” in Ng et al. (2009)]. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) confirmed the role of IS policy 
awareness in increasing the perceived costs of 
noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. 
Informing employees about IS policies through 
SETA programs is not the only channel for raising 
awareness among employees. Other channels 
include requiring users to participate in security risk 
management (SRM), which raises employee 
awareness of IS security risks (Spears & Barki, 
2010). 
Awareness campaigns do not have to include 
awareness about policies and procedures only; they 
may also include educational materials for 
employees on how to notice suspicious employees 
doing suspicious activities (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 
2006) as well as on how to be aware of social 
engineering techniques employed by outsiders or 
malicious insiders. Clicking on phishing links or 
responding to an email allegedly coming from the IT 
department requesting the username and password 
are well known hackers’ social engineering 
techniques to breach security. Building a robust 
behavioral knowledge among the employees may 
mitigate these types of threats. 
Technical Knowledge: Self-efficacy, response costs, 
and response efficacy comprise the technical 
dimension of awareness.  These are technical 
“know-hows” that are different from the behavioral 
policies. Security compliance self-efficacy is an 
employee’s perception of his or her technical ability 
to abide by the policy (Warkentin et al., 2011). The 
second subtheme, response costs, refers to the 
employee perception of how policy compliance (ex: 
software update) is time-consuming and impedes 
daily work, and the last (response efficacy) is 
employees’ perception of software effectiveness in 
preserving security.  
Self-efficacy positively impacts IS policy compliance 
(Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & 
Rao, 2009a; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Warkentin 
et al., 2011; Workman et al., 2008). If an employee 
has been trained to skillfully respond to any policy 
demand (e.g. training on password behaviors, 
Stanton et al., 2005), he or she will be apt to comply 
with the policy more than the employee who is 
poorly trained. “Resource availability” is a similar 
term advanced by Herath and Rao (2009a) and 
refers to the robust training of employees who 
subsequently tend to perceive themselves as more 
competent to comply with IS policies than the poorly 
trained employees. 
The second technical measure negatively affecting 
compliance, response cost, is the employees’ 
perception of IS solutions as being too cumbersome 
for daily activities. In other words, the response to 
comply may impede employees from giving their 
best to their projects. “Perceived response cost work 
impediment” and “perceived cost of compliance” are 
the terms used for this dimension of technical 
awareness. These constructs significantly affect 
attitudes toward solutions and intentions to comply 
(Herath & Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu at al., 2010). 
Therefore, management needs to design solutions 
that make IS policy compliance as least 
cumbersome as possible. Solutions can include less 
complex yet still powerful security countermeasures 
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and incorporating updates during working hours as 
part of job descriptions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
“Response efficacy” explains the effectiveness of IS 
policies or packages to protect information 
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). A higher perception 
of response efficacy is associated with the intention 
to comply (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) and a 
decrease in noncompliance (Workman et al., 2008). 
Adopting and disseminating awareness about 
powerful security tools in IS departments seems to 
be promising in encouraging IS policy compliance.  
Informing Employees (Malicious Threat) 
Pertaining to malicious threats, all the research 
dealing with IS policies also deal with IS policy 
awareness, which includes communicating 
information about sanctions upon failure to abide by 
IS policies (Straub, 1990; Straub & Nance, 1990; 
Straub & Welke, 1998). SETA programs dominate a 
good number of the papers categorized as dealing 
with negligent insiders, but the literature is silent on 
how SETA programs help the potential malicious 
insiders to devise their cunning plans. If IS 
management cannot differentiate between potential 
negligent and potential malicious employees, and IS 
provides training for all, does this training make the 
potential malicious insiders more knowledgeable or 
more capable of breaching the security? We found 
one study (Cronan et al., 2006) that may shed light 
on this subject. The students who were aware of the 
university policies were more prone to circumvent 
these policies than the students who were unaware 
of the policies. Furthermore, tech savvy students 
had a greater tendency to commit computer misuse 
than regular students (Cronan et al., 2006). 
However, it is not known if student behavior holds 
true among organizational employees. 
This study raises a question: why do “the informed 
and the trained” in organizations comply and “the 
informed and the trained” in universities not comply? 
If the difference in the two settings is the presence 
(or absence) of forces such as accountability (its 
presence in organizations and its absence in 
universities), this then raises the question of whether 
the reality of compliance in organizations is due to 
the increase in awareness and the increase in self-
efficacy or whether it is due to the presence of 
accountability. Since awareness of consequences 
(e.g. punishment) significantly impacts attitude on 
ethical decision making (Leonard et al., 2004), this 
could mean that awareness and training may help 
only in the presence of deterrence measures. 
Training is important, but equally important is the 
method, the context, and the situational conditions of 
the training. In Puhakainen and Siponen’s (2010)  
action research (one of the two action research 
studies, the other being that of Tsohou et al., 2015) 
they found that the integration of IS security training 
with the companies’ normal daily business 
communication was crucial in enhancing users’ 
motivation to comply with the IS security policies. In 
the same study, the authors found that continuous 
training, rather than a one-time training effort, 
increases compliance. 
Another study found that early communication of 
upcoming implementation of IS policies (the steps 
that the employees need to take and how to take 
them) is found to be a significant antecedent in 
decreasing negative employee reaction and 
computer abuse (Lowry et al., 2015). The “what to 
do” and the “how to do” are termed “explanation 
adequacy.” What could be a more promising 
antecedent though is the measuring of what we term 
“justification adequacy” and its impact on minimizing 
security policy violations. In other words the “why to 
comply” rather than just the “what” and the “how” is a 
promising construct for future research.  
In summary, since SETA programs may include 
ethics training, it is important for organizations to 
understand that ethics training is beneficial only with 
the employees who follow the rules out of social 
conformity and those who exhibit high levels of self-
control (Workman & Gathegi, 2007). Although the 
“E” (education) in SETA programs does not ensure 
100 percent compliance, it does significantly affect a 
section of the employees who have certain individual 
characteristics. Stated differently, forming policies, 
communicating them, and educating employees are 
like putting “do not enter” signs on roads. These 
signs are sufficient for most citizens but not enough 
for some: some need physical barriers blocking the 
entrance of the road or hidden cameras watched by 
police officers to monitor movement. The notion of 
barriers and monitoring is the dimension depicted by 
our next theme: technical countermeasures that 
control access to systems and monitor the traffic on 
the networks. 
Theme 3: Applying Technical Countermeasures 
This is one of the least studied themes regarding 
insider threats in the information systems literature, 
probably because the computer science journals 
may have been attracting all the technical studies 
and experiements. Only 29 percent of the articles 
(19 out of 65) tested technical countermeasures in 
the negligent threat category. Nevertheless, the 
socio-technical aspect of technical countermeasures 
needs more attention by IS security research 
because of its importance.  
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For example, the mere presence (or absence) of 
technical countermeasures (e.g. software 
monitoring) depicts the deterrence (or development) 
philosophy adopted by IS management (Theme 1). 
Monitoring the IPs of employee computers to know 
who failed to update the security software is a good 
example of a strict deterrence approach. The 
absence of such a strict measure could signify in the 
user’s perception that IS management is less 
serious about deterring noncompliance or at least 
less serious in using technical means to achieve 
deterrence. Another example is the impact of 
advance notice of technical monitoring: it seems the 
advance notice not only enhances deterrence but 
also cultivates trust between the employee and the 
organization. The advance notice of Internet usage 
monitoring has been shown to build trust between 
employees and organizations (Alder et al., 2006). 
We suggest that the studies on the socio-technical 
dimension of compliance need not be neglected nor 
left to the computer science field. 
Technical Countermeasures (Negligent and 
Malicious Threats) 
An important factor of enhancing technical 
countermeasures to deter IS misuse among 
negligent insiders is user participation in the design, 
creation, and implementation of technical 
preventives and access control (Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh, 2006; Spears & Barki, 2010) in the 
security risk management planning process. This 
technique positively influences the performance of 
technical security controls among users. 
A second technique to increase the compliance of 
negligent insiders is the employment of technical 
interfaces (software applications that identify which 
projects an employee is working on and what 
databases he or she is accessing) which in turn 
increases online identifiability in the department, 
expectations of evaluation, awareness of monitoring, 
and the social presence of peers. All of these factors 
may increase the perceived accountability of the 
user, diminishing his or her intention to violate 
organizational access policies (Vance et al., 2015). It 
is true that technical controls are somehow used to 
deter negligent threat, but using them to deter 
malicious threat is even more emphasized in IS 
security literature. 
In the case of malicious insider threats, 39 percent 
(11 out of 28) of the studies of malicious insiders 
consider technical countermeasures. These studies 
examine computer monitoring, access control, and 
auditing logs as ways to technically control and 
secure the systems. Tracking down questionable 
activities on the network and the subsequent 
punishment of perpetrators are the direct value of 
preventive countermeasures (Straub & Nance, 1990; 
Straub & Welke, 1998).  
Technical preventives do not just block an employee 
from accessing an unauthorized database; they also 
deter all employees from accessing unauthorized 
databases if, for example, the system generates a 
monthly report on each and every employee’s 
accessed files and databases and sends copies of 
the report each month to the respective employees 
and to their supervisors.  The key issue here is that 
IS users should be aware of such countermeasures 
(Straub & Welke, 1998) (through the report, in this 
example) for this channel to have a deterring effect. 
If and when the employees learn that the IT 
department is using technical means to monitor their 
computer behaviors,  they will be more likely to 
sense that the management is following a 
deterrence philosophy. For example, the presence 
of a monitoring system is usually communicated to 
employees by directly informing them about the 
presence of such a system (D’Arcy et al., 2009; 
Straub, 1990). 
A more specific monitoring system is the community 
anomaly detection system (CADS), which extracts 
relational patterns in the patient records’ access logs 
among work team members. Based on relational 
patterns, it detects a deviation from the pattern and 
sends a notice to security analysts to investigate the 
access logs of the user in question (Chen et al., 
2012a). 
Some compliance policies are subject to 
implementation by force through employing technical 
means. For example, enforcing the creation of 
complex secure passwords using a specific length of 
characters, capital and small letters, numbers, and 
punctuation are only possible through automated 
technical software. It is interesting to see how 
technical countermeasures enhance compliance in 
some dimensions, but at the same time, degrade it 
in other dimensions. Looking at the same case, 
password composition (numbers, punctuation, etc.) 
is significantly related to writing the password down 
(Zviran & Haga, 1999), and writing the password 
down is prohibited in the IS policies of organizations 
(see, for example, Renaud, 2012). IS management 
has yet to come up with solutions that ensure both 
the use of strong passwords and the prevention of 
writing the passwords down on paper or registering 
them in unencrypted unsecured smartphones. Since 
reusing passwords across sites is strongly 
discouraged, the users need tools to remember their 
ever increasing number of complex passwords. A 
solution could be the adoption or creation of 
password storage and management software 
solutions by IS departments. To the best of our 
knowledge, current IS departments are still fearful of 
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recommending the available third party solutions 
(e.g. LastPass). We suggest that each organization 
develop its own password storage website for its 
employees to use. Thus the organizational user 
passwords could remain inside the secure firewalls 
instead of being written on papers, saved on 
unsecured smartphones prone to be lost or stolen, 
or saved on third party cloud computing outsourced 
servers. 
Although the significance of increasing the 
awareness of technical countermeasures as a 
deterrence measure has been proven in the 
literature, we argue that past research dealt with this 
countermeasure in a one-sided manner. There could 
be side effects of making employees aware of the 
types of technical countermeasures used. Potential 
opportunistic or malicious insiders could take 
advantage of such information and devise their acts 
accordingly. Therefore we propose two layers of 
technical countermeasures: declared and 
undeclared. The declared ones may deter the 
majority of employees from thinking about 
circumventing policies, and the undeclared ones 
may catch those who attempted to circumvent the 
known countermeasure by other ways. 
In summary, applying technical countermeasures 
provides another layer of protection. This theme is in 
need of further IS research in order to more 
extensively cover the socio-technical side of it. The 
journals in the computer science and engineering 
disciplines contain extensive research on technical 
countermeasures, including access control, 
password mechanisms, and firewalls (Siponen & 
Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Future IS research should 
study the socio-technical effects of these technical 
countermeasures on insider behavior. We argue that 
this is an IS issue (socio-technical) rather than just a 
computer science issue (technical), because as we 
saw in the case of password change, employees 
may devise ways to circumvent technical 
countermeasures. 
Finally, we conclude the procedural and technical 
countermeasures with the following observation: 
evident in these reviews of the literature is the 
assumption implicit in most empirical IS security 
research that IS security is de facto “good”, that the 
more IS security, the better, and that motivating 
employees to comply with IS security is a highly 
desirable objective for IS departments. Moreover, 
the literature takes a distinct negative attitude 
towards employees who circumvent their 
organization’s IS security policies. However, recent 
IS security (ISsec) research is starting to challenge 
this assumption.  In an attempt to explain the high 
percentage of unexplained variance (50-70 percent) 
in employee IS security violations, D’Arcy et al. 
(2014) introduce the notion of stress related to the 
need to oblige IS security policies. Labeled 
technostress, this negative outcome experienced by 
employees trying to adhere to IS security policies 
reflects a downside of ISsec policies. We suggest 
that future research in IS security compliance needs 
to more comprehensively investigate the 
phenomenon of the downsides of IS security 
compliance efforts. 
Theme 4: Enhancing the Environmental 
Countermeasures 
Environmental countermeasures constitute the 
fourth and final theme of this study. The social 
environment plays a role in channelling deterring or 
encouraging messages to IS users. For example, 
negligent employees may experience shame 
inflicted on them by other more compliant 
employees. This social embarrassment channels a 
deterring message to other potential negligent 
insiders. This overarching theme of environment 
includes not just shame (which is part of subjective 
norms), but also organizational commitment and 
ethical climate, among others. Although this theme 
that comprises IT ethics is complex and intertwined 
on both individual and organizational levels 
(Chatterjee et al., 2015), we try to categorize the 
articles under separate groups: external and internal 
environments, corresponding to the organizational 
and individual levels respectively. 
This theme is well studied, with 71 percent of the 
articles (46 out of 65) measuring some aspect of the 
environment dimension, and can be grouped into 
two sections: external and internal. The external 
environment depicts the organizational 
characteristics, including subjective and descriptive 
norms, and the overall social and moral environment 
within the organization. The internal environment 
depicts the individual characteristics of the 
employee, including his or her moral character. 
External Environment (Negligent Threat) 
Pertaining to negligent threats, ethical, professional, 
legal, and societal environments and climates in an 
organization could increase or decrease IS security 
policy compliance intentions (Banerjee et al., 1998; 
Leonard et al., 2004; Posey et al., 2011). The three 
major expressions of the external environment of 
organizations are subjective norms, descriptive 
norms, and organizational justice pertaining to IS 
security. 
IS Security Subjective Norms: These norms refer to 
the perception of the IS user regarding whether his 
or her immediate significant environment (managers, 
colleagues, etc.) expects him or her to perform a 
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certain behavior (Herath & Rao, 2009a). Subjective 
norms are the same as normative beliefs, which 
increase ethical behavior intention regarding IS use 
(Leonard & Cronan, 2001;  Pahnila et al., 2007; 
Siponen et al., 2010). If a manager has high 
expectations of his or her subordinates, it is likely 
that this will impact the behavior of the majority of 
the manager’s employees. Johnston and Warkentin 
(2010) named this construct “social influence” and 
found, like Herath and Rao (2009a), that social 
influence impacts behavioral intentions. Along the 
same lines, Banerjee et al. (1998) found that 
situational characteristics (conventional beliefs and 
high expectations of managers) increased ethical 
behavior intention. In an opposite result, Siponen 
and Vance (2010) found that the impact of shame is 
nonsignificant when measured in the same model 
along with neutralization techniques used by 
employees. This means that the countermeasure 
results are not solely dependent on the message 
communicated from outside the person but also on 
the individual characteristics from within that person, 
which will be elaborated more fully in the internal 
environment section below. 
Although neutralization is a cognitive technique, 
there are other noncognitive forces that may 
neutralize shame and the effect of the organizational 
security culture on the employees. For example, 
virtual status is the level and degree of business 
activities that an employee implements from different 
remote locations compared to within the 
organization itself (D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). These 
researchers found that virtual status increases 
technology misuse intention. We argue that this 
misuse is due to the absence of or decrease in the 
effect of organizational security culture on the 
employees (shame or subjective norms are 
neutralized in this case). 
Descriptive norms refer to the perception of an IS 
user as to whether his or her colleagues are abiding 
by the IS policies or not. Herath and Rao (2009a) 
found that descriptive norms positively affect 
intention to comply. Banerjee et al. (1998) included 
role models in their description of situational 
characteristics. Apparently, good role models impact 
the ethical climate of the organization and channel a 
message of encouraging compliance. 
Organizational Justice: Two studies investigated the 
organizational focus of justice in relation to IS 
policies and the expectations of IS management. 
They found that positive perception of organizational 
justice significantly decreases the intentional 
noncompliance of employees. The organizational 
justice theme regarding fair communication of 
sanctions and just distribution of sanctions among 
perpetrators is first investigated by Willison and 
Warkentin (2013) who proposed that the 
organizational injustice may increase the 
disgruntlement and subsequently the intentional 
computer abusive behaviors by the employees. The 
propositions advanced by Willison and Warkentin 
(2013) were tested by Li et al. (2014) who found that 
the increase in procedural justice and the distributive 
justice is positively related to IS policy compliance 
intentions. 
External Environment (Malicious Threat) 
Pertaining to malicious threats, subjective norms 
have no significance impact on malicious intentions. 
In contrast negative descriptive norms (bad role 
models) increase malicious predisposition among 
colleagues. One of the major predictors of computer 
crime is associating with friends who engage in the 
activity (Skinner & Fream, 1997). In other words, 
learning computer crime is primarily peer driven, 
which could be an echo of descriptive norms. 
Regarding subjective norms, Hu et al. (2011) found 
that shame had no impact on malicious insiders, 
unlike their negligent counterparts. This may be 
attributable to the criminal mindset that had already 
accounted for the cost of losing social credibility; 
therefore, shame may not have its full impact.  
In summary, developing and sustaining an ethical 
environment maximizes IS security (Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh, 2006). In our survey, the external 
environment described organizational justice, as well 
as organizational subjective and descriptive norms 
in their positive and negative dimensions 
(reasonable expectations, role model and social 
pressure, differential association, respectively). We 
now turn attention to the internal environment 
section. Whereas the external environment deals 
with the issues outside and around the individual, 
the internal environment deals with the issues within 
him or her. 
Internal Environment (Negligent Threat) 
The internal environment is the personal individual 
moral convictions of each employee, including 
ethics, morality, organizational commitment, apathy, 
denial of responsibility, neutralization techniques, 
individual propensity, and locus of control. For 
example, individuals who have an internal locus of 
control take responsibility for their own actions, and 
therefore may be less inclined to omit IS security 
precautions at work (Workman et al., 2008). Some 
employees may be predisposed toward higher self-
control. This predisposition increases an individual’s 
intentions to comply with IS policies (Hu et al., 
2015). In the same way, Lowry and Moody (2015) 
found that reactance proneness (another personal 
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characteristic that makes a person inclined to react 
to rules) may lead to security violation intention. 
On the negligent level, Banerjee et al. (1998) talked 
about individual ethical characteristics that influence 
behavioral intent and high moral commitment that 
decreases IS misuse intention (D’Arcy et al., 2009). 
Gattiker and Kelley (1999) applied different levels of 
morality to the IT environment: personal 
(preferences and tastes), conventional (societal 
norms that dictate the perception of non-harmful but 
nevertheless unacceptable behaviors), and moral 
(social norms that dictate the perception of harmful 
acts). The latter study not only found that users differ 
from each other within the domains of morality, but 
also that young male employees are more 
vulnerable to err in the moral domain. Cronan et al. 
(2006) agreed, finding that males committed more IS 
misuse than females. Loch and Conger’s (1996) 
findings may hint at a solution for the gender issue. 
The findings suggest that men make ethical 
decisions in computing acts based more on their 
attitude toward the ethical scenario rather than on 
the social norms, while woman intend to act ethically 
or unethically based more on the social norms, 
rather than on their attitude. This study tells us that 
men and women do not respond in the same way to 
the same countermeasures to the same degree. IT 
professionals probably need to work on the attitudes 
of men toward compliance, while the expectations 
and pressures of the socio-organizational 
environment will drive women toward compliance. 
Social norms do not seem to significantly affect the 
disposition of men toward ethical computing acts 
(Loch & Conger, 1996). This finding suggests two 
things: first, that the internal environment is a 
moderator of the relationship between 
procedural/technical countermeasures and 
employee compliance, and second, that there is no 
one-size-fits-all strategy toward the different types of 
insiders but rather that strategies should be 
customized based on individual characteristics. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) studied neutralization 
techniques and found that all employees with high 
usage of these techniques were more inclined to 
violate IS policies. The scenario examples of their 
study include the following items: “It is not as wrong 
to violate a company information security policy that 
is not reasonable” and “It is all right to violate a 
company information security policy if you get your 
work done.” This echoes what Harrington (1996) 
found to be true in one of her IS ethical hypotheses: 
“employees with high responsibility denial have a 
propensity to enact computer abuse.” 
Along the same lines, organizational commitment 
was found to significantly increase intentions to 
comply (Herath & Rao, 2009a), and apathy was 
found to decrease precautions taken to secure 
systems (Kirsch & Boss, 2007). Therefore, IS 
management should build the moral reasoning and 
the organizational commitment of employees by 
working on improving the internal and external 
ethical climates. Education has been a proven 
method in shaping the acceptable moral reasoning 
of individuals (Davis, 1987; Rest, 1979; Thoma & 
Davison, 1983). Another promising way to increase 
compliance is through legislation. Governmental 
regulations on IS policies increase individual beliefs 
in IS compliance (Cannoy & Salam, 2010). Thus 
organizations can push governments to legislate IS 
security policies. This will help increase compliance 
in organizations. 
Nevertheless, there are some signs of new 
emerging dimensions being studied in the internal 
environment theme. These dimensions include the 
adoption of electrocognitive testing devices in 
measuring ISsec behaviors and the study of 
employees who attempt to enhance the security in 
their organizations above and beyond their basic 
duties. These two trends are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
Security research started using electro-
encephalography (EEG) measures which are 
neurophysiological lab experiments that analyze the 
trends of the brain waves that might be responsible 
for different security related behaviors (Vance et al., 
2014). This type of IS research found that only those 
employees who have neurocognitive evidence of 
having higher self-control (neurons of the brain 
related to self-control are for some reason more 
developed) need to be trusted with and assigned to 
more sensitive digital assets (Hu et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, schools of law assert that this type of 
neurological research, although interesting, is of little 
practical value because of ethical sensitivity and 
legal regulations governing practices such as 
employee job assignments that are the results of 
psychological screening (London & Bray, 1980). 
Research on employees who attempt to enhance 
the security in their organizations above and beyond 
their expected basic duties was the focus of Hsu et 
al. (2015). They found out that organizational 
commitment, involvement and attachment 
significantly increase this “extra-role” security 
compliance. Although the antecedents of 
organizational commitment are not novel, 
nevertheless the dependent variable is somewhat 
novel. This type of new compliance behaviors are 
more distinct than the “traditional” dependent 
variables of security violation or compliance intention 
and may deserve separate considerations and 
explanations in the future (see Guo, 2013). 
The DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems 27 Volume 48, Number 3, August 2017
Internal Environment (Malicious Threat) 
Regarding malicious insiders, an interesting insight 
comes from the canonical correlation analysis done 
by Shropshire (2009), when he analyzed 
documented stories of malicious and opportunistic 
insiders who were legally prosecuted in the past. 
The independent variables of this study were 
financial changes, relationship strains, substance 
abuse, and job changes; the dependent variables 
were IT sabotage (i.e., destroying data) and IT 
espionage (i.e., selling data). The results showed 
that only financial changes in the life of an employee 
correlated with IT espionage: financial crises moved 
employees to sell information to competitors. 
Relationship strains, substance abuse, and job 
changes correlated with IT sabotage. These findings 
may give IS management insights on the importance 
of scanning, profiling, and keeping a supervising eye 
on the changes in the lives of employees. The 
application of these findings is not unique to IS 
employees; nevertheless, IS management needs to 
apply these proactive methods to keep malicious 
insiders at bay. One of the major predictors of 
computer crime is associating with friends who 
engage in the activity. Learning computer crime is 
primarily peer-driven (Skinner & Fream, 1997), and 
peer behavior positively influences policy 
compliance intention (Herath & Rao, 2009b). 
Therefore, IS management should take heed to 
cultivate an IS department with the highest 
standards of moral and ethical behavior. This does 
not necessarily mean that IS departments should be 
saturated with the uncomfortable tension of shame, 
especially since shame and informal social 
sanctions are not promising constructs in deterring 
the misuse intentions of malicious insiders (Hu et al., 
2011). However, attracting and keeping a large base 
of ethical employees and encouraging them to 
expect the highest standards of IS policy compliance 
from their peers should deter potential malicious 
insiders from acting on their schemes. 
A third insight of securing the environment is found 
in Son (2011). The congruence between employees’ 
intrinsic values and organizational values will 
encourage employees to abide by IS policies.  
Therefore, IS management should survey potential 
employees and only accept those whose moral 
values coincide with those of the organization. 
Nevertheless, this might not be realistic in the cases 
of outsourcing the service where IS management 
has no control over the employees of the provider. 
Future research should investigate the best ways to 
implement this congruence. 
We have already noticed how neutralization 
techniques nullify the impact of formal and informal 
sanctions in the case of negligent insiders (Siponen 
& Vance, 2010). In the case of malicious insiders, 
this relationship may also hold true. Investigating 
new techniques to profile and identify malicious 
insiders or perhaps to empirically test the situational 
and behavioral characteristics or criminological 
settings (Banerjee et al., 1998; Willison & 
Backhouse, 2006) are some areas for studying 
malicious employees in the future. 
In summary, the internal environment captures the 
ethical dimension, morality, organizational 
commitment, apathy, and neutralization strategies, 
all initiated within and related to the individual 
characteristics of the IS user. Promising 
countermeasures on the level of the internal 
environment are pre-employment screening, 
profiling, and training. Overall, the theme of 
environmental countermeasures covers the external 
(organizational climate) and internal (individual 
characteristics) dimensions that affect IS 
compliance. Lately, some authors (Chen et al., 
2012b; Hu et al., 2012) have started using the term 
“security culture” in organizations, which is along the 
same lines of what we called environmental 
countermeasures. 
Thus far, we described the four overarching themes 
emerging from the literature treating each theme 
simultaneously on both negligent and malicious 
insider levels. We now proceed to give brief 
summary overviews of negligent and malicious 
insider threats. 
Summary Overview of Negligent and Malicious 
Insider Threats 
As shown in Tables 3a and 3b, we found a less 
diversified research stream on malicious insider 
threats (3a) than on negligent insider threats (3b). 
The table is divided into two subcategories: articles 
dealing purely with malicious threats and articles 
dealing with both malicious and negligent threats. 
Table 3a suggests that the malicious category, an 
important but sensitive one, is not drawing much 
attention from researchers (only 22 different primary 
authors vs. 31 for negligent threats), although acts of 
espionage and sabotage are among the first five 
extremely significant overall threats (and the first 
three insider threats) to information security 
(Whitman, 2004). The uncategorized column (in 
Table 3b) incorporates the papers that were not 
clearly identified by the authors, either because of 
the absence or the vagueness of the instrument. 
Tables 3a and 3b are the secondary contributions of 
this study, providing an overview of IS security 
research. 
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Table 3a. Malicious Threats: Summary of Investigated Issues 
Authors Date 
Philosophy of 
Procedural 
Countermeasures Technical 
Countermeasures 
Environmental 
Countermeasures 
Deterrence Development 
Forming 
Policies 
Informing 
Employees 
Purely Malicious (4 studies) 
Hu et al. 2011 +         + 
Skinner & 
Fream 
1997 +         + 
Chen et al. 2012a +       +   
Willison & 
Warkentin 
2013 +     + 
Malicious and Negligent Intertwined (24 studies) 
Boss et al. 2015  +  +   
Chatterjee et 
al. 
2015 + + + + + + 
Chen et al. 2012b + 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Chen & 
Zahedi 
2016  +  +   
D'Arcy et al. 2014 +  +  +  
Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh 
2006 + + + + + + 
Herath et al. 2014  +   +  
Hsu et al. 2015  + +   + 
Hu et al. 2015      + 
Johnston et 
al. 
2015 + + + +   
Kankanhalli 
et al. 
2003 + 
   
+ 
 
Lee et al. 2004 + 
 
+ + 
 
+ 
Li et al. 2014 + + + +  + 
Lowry et al. 2015 + + + +  + 
Lowry & 
Moody 
2015 +  +   + 
Shropshire 2009 
     
+ 
Son 2011 + 
    
+ 
Stahl et al. 2012 +  +    
Straub 1990 + 
 
+ + + + 
Straub & 
Nance 
1990 + 
 
+ + + 
 
Straub & 
Welke 
1998 + 
 
+ + + 
 
Tsohou et al. 2015  + + +   
Vance et al. 2014  +    + 
Vance et al. 2015 +   + + + 
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Table 3b. Negligent Threats: Summary of Investigated Issues 
Authors Date 
Philosophy of 
Procedural 
Countermeasures Technical 
Countermeasures 
Environmental 
Countermeasures 
Deterrence Development 
Forming 
Policies 
Informing 
Employees 
Purely Negligent (37 studies) 
Alder et al. 2006         +   
Banerjee 1998           + 
Boss et al. 2009 + + + +   + 
Bulgurcu et al. 2010 + +   +   + 
Cannoy & 
Salam 
2010     + +   + 
Cronan et al. 2006     + +   + 
D'Arcy & 
Devaraj 
2012 +   +     + 
D’Arcy et al. 2009 +   + + + + 
D'Arcy & Hovav 2007     + + +   
Gattiker & 
Kelley 
1999           + 
Guo & Yuan 2012 +  +   + 
Guo et al. 2011 + +       + 
Harrington 1996 +   + +   + 
Herath & Rao  2009a + + + + + + 
Herath & Rao  2009b + + +     + 
Hovav & D'Arcy 2012 +   +   + + 
Hu et al. 2012   + +     + 
Johnston & 
Warkentin  
2010   +   +   + 
Kirsch & Boss 2007 + + +     + 
Leonard 2001           + 
Leonard et al. 2004       +   + 
Li et al. 2010 +         + 
Loch & Conger 1996           + 
Myyry et al. 2009 +         + 
Ng et al.  2009   +   +   + 
Pahnila & 
Siponen 
2007 + +       + 
Peace et al. 2003 +         + 
Puhaikenen & 
Siponen 
2010   + + +     
Siponen et al. 2010 + +   +   + 
Siponen & 
Vance  
2010 +         + 
Smith et al. 2012 +  + +   
Spears & Barki 2010     + + +   
Stanton et al. 2005   +   + +   
Vance et al. 2012   +   +   + 
Warkentin et al. 2011   +   +   + 
Workman et al. 2008   +       + 
Zviran & Haga 1999         +   
Uncategorized (2 studies) 
Doherty & 
Fulford 
2005     +       
Workman & 
Gathegi 
2007 +     +   + 
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Upon first glance of Table 3b, we find a well-
diversified research stream on negligent insider 
threats. The research was spread over an inclusive 
timeframe of 1996 to 2015. Articles incorporating 
one or more of the identified themes and subthemes 
are marked with a plus sign in the relative theme 
and subtheme columns. We found a spike in 
studying negligent insiders in the more recent years 
(78 percent of the insider articles, 36 out of 46 
papers, were from 2007-2015 inclusive). 
Table 4 summarizes our findings (the themes, the 
interaction between the different philosophies on 
one hand and the different countermeasures on the 
other) and highlights the study areas to which future 
research may turn its attention. This table is 
considered one of the main contributions of this 
study. We identified two philosophies of IS 
management (philosophy of deterrence and 
philosophy of development) and three 
countermeasures (procedural, technical, and 
environmental). The interaction and relation between 
philosophies and countermeasures, what we know 
about them and what we still lack knowledge of, are 
discussed in the next paragraphs. 
The literature informs us that coercive procedures, 
like tough punishments (i.e., sanctions), in the case 
of noncompliance are emphasized under IS 
department philosophy of deterrence. Nevertheless, 
we do not know if these sanctions would be 
implemented in an organization where the 
philosophy of development is stressed. Thus, the 
cell in the first row and column of Table 4 mentions a 
“high emphasis” on sanctions, and the cell in the first 
row and second column mentions “future research.” 
Since the literature does not cover the existence of 
deterrent procedural measures in organizations that 
adopt an encouraging developmental philosophy, we 
leave the case open for future research. 
Based on our review findings, we posit that 
empowering procedural measures (e.g. training, 
rewards) and empowering environmental measures 
(e.g. praising good role models) are highly employed 
in organizations where a developmental IS 
philosophy of management is dominant. We provide 
examples and proofs of this in the conceptual 
themes section. Along the same lines, coercive 
technical measures (e.g. computer monitoring) and 
coercive environmental measures (e.g. subjective 
norms) could be implemented in organizations 
where a deterrence IS philosophy of management is 
dominant (see the conceptual themes section). 
Based on the extant literature, what is still unknown 
is whether developmental countermeasures 
(procedural, technical, or environmental) are 
employed or made use of in organizations that have 
a deterrence philosophy, and if they are: 1) what is 
the nature of such countermeaures, 2)  are they 
beneficial or not, and most importantly, 3) what is 
the nature of interaction between the coercive and 
empowering countermeasures (i.e., does an 
empowering countermeasure neutralize the 
deterrent effect of a coercive countermeasure?). The 
same questions could be asked about coercive 
countermeasures implemented in organizations 
where a developmental IS philosophy is 
implemented. The probable use of developmental 
countermeasures in organizations that have a 
deterrence philosophy and the probable use of 
deterrent countermeasures in organizations that 
have a development philosophy could be labeled 
strange bedfellows. These countermeasures and 
philosophies may interact. The interactions are still 
largely unknown for IS security research, therefore 
we categorize them under “future research.” We find 
an insight and a pointer to such an interaction in 
economics. Both punishments and rewards are 
tested together in the same experimental model and 
the results are different than when punishment is 
tested alone apart from the rewards, or the latter 
apart from the former (Andreoni et al., 2003). In 
Andreoni et al., the authors had the participants play 
a simple proposer-responder game. In the first 
stage, a participant (called the proposer) chooses 
what portion of $2.40 he or she needs to transfer to 
the responder. The main difference among the four 
treatments is in the responder’s capacity to punish 
or reward during the second stage. Four treatments 
are available: 1) neither punish nor reward, 2) 
punish or reward by decreasing or increasing the 
proposer’s earnings by 5 cents at a cost of 1 cent, 3) 
only punish, and 4) only reward. The study found 
that using both punishments and rewards in the 
same treatment had a significant strong effect. Even 
though generous offers were not punished, such 
generosity only occurred when the threat of 
punishments existed. The same, similar,  or different 
interactions may also be present in IS security. For 
example, it may be true that IS security 
developmental and encouraging endeavors will 
show maximum impact on IS compliance intentions 
only if and when there is a threat of punishment. 
Overview of Theories 
The major theories used in IS policy compliance and 
insider threat issues in both their forms (negligent 
and malicious) are depicted in Table 5a. Thirty one 
percent of the articles (21 out of 67) used a theory 
that drew upon the GDT of criminology. The second 
most-used theory is the theory of planned behavior 
(TPB) (18 percent; 12 papers), followed by the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA) (13 percent; nine 
papers), and protection motivation theory (13 
percent; nine papers). 
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Table 4. The Research Findings and Suggestions for Future Research 
Countermeasures 
IS Management Security Philosophy 
Deterrence Development 
Procedural 
Coercive Procedural High Emphasis (ex: sanctions) Future Research  
Empowering Procedural Future Research  
High Emphasis (ex: rewards, 
training) 
Technical 
Coercive Technical High Emphasis  Future Research  
Empowering Technical Future Research  Future Research  
Environmental 
Coercive Environmental 
High Emphasis (ex: subjective 
norms) 
Future Research  
Empowering Environmental Future Research  High Emphasis (ex: role models) 
 
Table 5a. Major Theories Used in IS Policy Compliance 
General Deterrence Theory (32%)* Theory of Planned 
Behavior (18%) 
Theory of Reasoned 
Action (14%) 
Protection Motivation 
Theory (14%) 
Boss et al. (2009); Chen et al. (2012b); 
D'Arcy et al. (2009); D’Arcy & Devaraj 
(2012); Guo et al. (2011); Guo & Yuan 
(2012);  Harrington (1996); Herath & Rao 
(2009a); Hu et al. (2011); Kankanhalli et al. 
(2003); Lee et al. (2004); Li et al. (2014); 
Pahnila et al. (2007); Peace et al., (2003); 
Siponen et al. (2010); Siponen & Vance 
(2010); Son (2011); Straub (1990); Straub & 
Nance (1990); Straub & Welke (1998); 
Workman & Gathegi (2007) 
Banerjee et al. (1998); Boss 
et al. (2009); Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010); Cronan et al. (2006); 
Herath & Rao (2009a); Hu et 
al. (2012); Johnston & 
Warkentin (2010); Lee et al. 
(2004); Leonard et al. (2004); 
Ng et al. (2009); Peace et al. 
(2003);  Workman & Gathegi 
(2007) 
Banerjee et al. (1998); 
Cannoy & Salam (2010); 
Guo et al. (2011); 
Johnston & Warkentin 
(2010); Lee et al. (2004); 
Leonard et al. (2004); 
Loch & Conger (1996); 
Pahnila et al. (2007); 
Siponen et al. (2010) 
Boss et al. (2015); Herath 
& Rao (2009a); Chen & 
Zahedi (2016);  Johnston 
& Warkentin (2010); 
Johnston et al. (2015); 
Pahnila et al. (2007); 
Siponen et al. (2010); 
Vance et al. (2012); 
Workman et al. (2008) 
*Percentage of articles using the theory (exclusively or partly). 
Seventy six percent of the articles (51 out of 67) 
incorporated at least one of these four theories. Only 
33 articles (49 percent) did not use any of these 
major four theories. The first three theories are 
heavily used because of the vast similarities 
between regular criminology and cybercriminology 
(GDT), the explanatory power of human behavior in 
management (TPB and TRA), and because some 
key highly successful pioneer articles were based on 
GDT (namely Straub, 1990 and Straub & Nance, 
1990), which triggered a wave of adaptations of the 
same theory.  
Future research is advised to depart from GDT and 
PMT by incorporating other theories from 
criminology (e.g., rehabilitation theory, incapacitation 
theory, and retribution theory) or theories from other 
reference disciplines of psychology and 
management. Table 5b depicts other theories used 
in IS compliance research to date. In Siponen and 
Oinas-Kukkonen’s (2007) security review article, 
they underlined the fact that since deterrence 
criminology strategies are used extensively, 
researchers should investigate non-deterrence 
motivational and ethical strategies as well, based on 
psychology and philosophy, respectively. Comparing 
Tables 5a and 5b, it appears that over the last 
decade (2007 and on), researchers have 
investigated more non-deterrence strategies as 
opposed to previous years. Nevertheless, GDT and 
PMT still occupy prominent places among the 
preferred theories among IS security researchers. 
Overview of Methodologies 
Figure 1 depicts the methodologies used in the 
sample articles of this review paper. Seventy-six 
percent of the articles (51 out of 67) incorporated 
surveys in their research methodology, and 72 
percent used surveys solely as their instrument (11 
percent for lab experiments, 6 percent for interviews, 
5 percent mixed methods; 3 percent for action 
research, and 1.5 percent for direct observation of 
logs and archival analysis each).  
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Table 5b. Other Theories Used in IS Policy Compliance 
Theory Source 
Accountability Theory Vance et al. (2015) 
Action-Network Theory Tsohou et al. (2015) 
Agency Theory Boss et al. (2009); Herath & Rao (2009b);  
Buy-in Theory of Participation Spears & Barki (2010) 
Causal Reasoning Theory Posey et al. (2011) 
Cognitive Learning Theory Lowry et al. (2013) 
Contextualism Theory Tsohou et al. (2015) 
Coping Theory D’Arcy et al. (2014) 
Domain Theory of Moral Development Gattiker & Kelley (1999) 
Emergent Interactions Theory Spears & Barki (2010) 
Ethical Theory Chatterjee et al. (2015) 
Expectancy Theory Lowry et al. (2013) 
Expected Utility Theory Peace et al. (2003) 
Extended Parallel Process Model Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
Fairness Theory Lowry et al. (2015) 
Fear Appeal Theory Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
Fishbein and Ajzens Theory Leonard & Cronan (2001) 
Habit Theory Vance et al. (2012) 
Innovation Diffusion Theory Siponen et al. (2010) 
Kohlberg Cognitive Moral Development Theory Leonard & Cronan (2001); Myyry et al. (2009) 
Moral Disengagement Theory D’Arcy et al. (2014) 
Neutralization Theory Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Organismic Integration Theory Boss et al. (2009) 
Organizational Control Theory 
Boss et al. (2009); Kirsch & Boss (2007); Lowry & Moody 
(2015) 
Organizational Justice Theory Li et al. (2014) 
Rational Choice Theory Bulgurcu et al. (2010); Hu et al. (2011); Li et al. (2010);  
Reactance Theory Lowry & Moody (2015); Lowry et al. (2015) 
Self-Control Theory Hu et al. (2015) 
Social Cognitive Theory Workman et al. (2008) 
Social Control Theory Hsu et al. (2015); Hu et al. (2011); Lee et al. (2004) 
Theory (cont.) Source 
Social Influence Theory Boss et al. (2009) 
Social Learning Theory Skinner & Fream (1997); Warkentin et al. (2011) 
Structuration Theory Tsohou et al. (2015) 
System Quality Theory Spears & Barki (2010) 
Technology Acceptance Theory (TAM) Herath et al. (2014) 
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory Herath et al. (2014) 
Theory of Motivational Types of Values Myyry et al. (2009) 
Universal Constructive Instructional Theory Puhaikenen & Siponen (2010) 
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 Figure 1: The Distribution of Papers across Methodologies 
Furthermore, these 88 percent of the survey articles 
have some measure of common-method variance 
risk, since the studies asked the same employees 
about the countermeasures as well as their intention 
to comply. Along the same lines, Workman et al. 
(2008) found that there is some discrepancy 
between subjective and objective compliance 
measures. The first is related to the survey 
measuring self-reported subjective compliance and 
the second to the observation of computer logs 
measuring actual objective compliance (computer 
logs of password changes, security patch updates, 
and backups). Future research should, where 
possible, rely less on subjective measurements 
(surveys) and more on objective methods to 
measure compliance (observation of logs, lab 
experiments, triangulation of surveys, etc.). 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge the difficulty of 
measuring actual compliance in organizations or 
requesting and accessing computer logs from IT 
departments. In the case of the latter, these logs are 
highly vulnerable data that few organizations are 
willing to disclose. Even more difficult is the 
collection of data about malicious noncompliance, 
since actual malicious behavior is typically only 
noticed after the fact, and then the IT department is 
even more protective of the information about the 
incidents in order to protect the organization from a 
poor reputation and bankruptcy. Lab experiment 
simulations, archival document analysis, and 
interviewing convicted IT criminals may be promising 
instruments in research on malicious insiders and 
may alleviate the paucity and difficulty of gathering 
data on malicious threats. 
Contributions and Conclusion  
This paper has presented a review of the literature 
on IS security policy compliance in organizations. 
Since the literature does not explicitly differentiate 
malicious from nonmalicious threats (Guo et al., 
2011), we endeavored to divide the articles in our 
sample into those dealing with malicious employees 
and those dealing with negligent employees. This is 
one of the contributions of this study (Appendix A). 
Appendix A shows that the majority of researchers 
lumped all insider types (naïve, opportunistic, and 
malicious) into one camp and tried to measure and 
test their models accordingly. This has the inherent 
weakness of not knowing how each insider type 
behaves. Future research may try to test models 
with each insider type and find out if there is a 
difference among the direction, significance, and 
power of the relationships between each 
countermeasure and philosophy on one hand and 
policy compliance or compliance intention on the 
other. 
The second contribution is the all-inclusive Insider 
Types - Matrix (Table 1), which does not have the 
weaknesses of traditional taxonomies (Stanton et 
al., 2005; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Traditional 
taxonomies, although they do have the insiders’ 
malicious or negligent intention component, either 
lack the willingness to comply or the ability 
components, or in the case of Guo (2013) does not 
come up with insider or IS user names or types. Our 
taxonomy divides IS users based on all three 
dimensions of intention, ability, and willingness as 
well as names the types of insiders (negligent naïve, 
negligent opportunistic, and malicious insider). 
The third and a major contribution of this article is 
the identification of the building blocks for a potential 
indigenous IS security theory. Grounding the 
analysis in the literature, we inductively identified 
four themes to foster Information Security policy 
compliance among employees. The four themes are: 
1) IS management philosophies of deterrence and 
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development, 2) procedural countermeasures, 3) 
technical countermeasures, and 4) environmental 
countermeasures. We propose that future research 
can draw upon these themes, find the relationships 
among them, and use them as the building blocks of 
a potential indigenous IS security theory. 
The fourth contribution consists of a list of potential 
research areas regarding the interactions between 
different philosophies in one hand and different 
countermeasures on the other (Table 4). The four 
contributions mentioned above are on the academic 
theoretical level.  
On the professional level, our review identifies and 
summarizes the antecedents to IS policy 
compliance. In the case of negligent insiders, these 
mainly include employing a deterrence or 
encouraging approach, forming policies, imparting 
behavioral and technical knowledge to employees, 
making use of technical countermeasures, and 
enhancing the environment by clarifying the 
subjective norms, encouraging positive descriptive 
norms, improving organizational justice, and 
developing inner ethical convictions among users. In 
the case of malicious insiders, these antecedents 
mainly include employing a deterrence approach, 
forming policies, informing employees about these 
policies, intensively making use of technical 
countermeasures, and enhancing the environment 
by clarifying the subjective norms, decreasing 
negative descriptive norms, and noticing personal 
struggles in the lives of employees. Specific 
managerial practicial insights were given in the body 
of the text whenever the relevancy demanded. 
Future research should carefully trace security 
incidents to negligent, opportunistic, or malicious 
reasons. Dividing the target audience into the types 
of insiders (Crossler et al., 2013) and devising a 
specific approach for each type (Straub & Widon, 
1984) and a weighted amount of procedural versus 
technical countermeasures may yield the most 
promising results. At a minimum level, if the papers 
explicitly define which type of incidents they are 
measuring, it will be clear that the measured 
variables would be significantly related to that 
specific type of insider or incident and perhaps 
researchers will find that some countermeasures are 
more or less successful toward decreasing other 
types of incidents. 
Although practitioner-based journals and magazines 
cover security standards and best practices 
extensively (Ma & Pearson, 2005),  the need for 
peer-reviewed academic theory-based and 
empirically tested research on IS policy compliance 
remains large. Moving toward the development of a 
theory of security, and specifically, a theory of 
insider threat mitigation is in order. We believe that 
the review presented in this paper provides the 
building blocks of such a potential future theory. 
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